REPLACING Murray had been under consideration since his defeat at the second Gaza battle. Robertson had suggested it to the War Cabinet as early as 23 April, and the Cabinet had agreed. But finding the right man to succeed him was not easy. All the really competent generals were already fully employed. Further, the Egyptian post required a man who was in rank a general, who could command troops in battle, but who was also a diplomat, a courtier, and an administrator of ability. Murray had performed extremely well in the last three roles, while failing as a commander through being too cautious. Inducing the Arabs to revolt had been a very ticklish matter, and they had to be kept in the fight as well; the internal situation in Egypt was never easy, and it was always necessary to keep the khedivial court sweet; he had performed prodigies of organization and administration in sorting out the messy situation among the British forces who washed up into Egypt after the Gallipoli failure, and in organizing the expeditionary force into Palestine. He had been just as successful in pushing that force across the Sinai desert, with its attached railway and pipeline. His failures were as a commander of troops in active warfare and in his choice of subordinate commanders.

The new commander would need to be a vigorous fighting soldier, a man to inspire the dispirited troops to victory. The Prime Minister thought he found the right man in General Jan Christiaan Smuts, the former South African guerrilla leader who had commanded the imperial forces in German East Africa. He was, like Lloyd George, a lawyer, a politician, and a Christian, and the two men became friends; but the army command was by no means happy about him, for these were not the qualities required of a modern general. The campaign in German East had been only partially successful – the German commander there remained an active enemy until November 1918 – and Smuts's command there had been badly organized and appallingly expensive in men.

Smuts was offered the post on 1 May, and took the whole of the month to consider it. This in itself was a poor sign, for the matter clearly had a degree of urgency.