Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- List of Maps
- A Note on Names
- Introduction
- Prologue: To the Border of Palestine
- 1 The Decision to Invade
- 2 Defeat at Gaza
- 3 Defeated Again
- 4 The Wider Context
- 5 The Allenby Effect
- 6 The Third Attempt at Gaza
- 7 The Turkish Lines Broken
- 8 The Drive North
- 9 The Hills of Judaea
- 10 Jerusalem for Chistmas
- 11 Why the British Won
- Appendix: Composition of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force
- Maps
- Notes
- Sources and Bibliography
- Index
6 - The Third Attempt at Gaza
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 March 2023
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- List of Maps
- A Note on Names
- Introduction
- Prologue: To the Border of Palestine
- 1 The Decision to Invade
- 2 Defeat at Gaza
- 3 Defeated Again
- 4 The Wider Context
- 5 The Allenby Effect
- 6 The Third Attempt at Gaza
- 7 The Turkish Lines Broken
- 8 The Drive North
- 9 The Hills of Judaea
- 10 Jerusalem for Chistmas
- 11 Why the British Won
- Appendix: Composition of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force
- Maps
- Notes
- Sources and Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The bombardment of the city of Gaza and its fortifications was on a greater scale than anything yet seen in this campaign. The divisional artilleries of all three infantry divisions, plus the corps artillery, were all involved, primarily with the aim of suppressing the Turkish guns. 68 heavy guns were used, each with a lavish provision of ammunition, half of them assigned to the ‘bombardment’ group, and half to the counter-battery groups – though the first task for all the guns was the destruction of the enemy artillery. In addition, naval ships joined in on the 29th, from the British cruiser Grafton, the French Requin once more, five monitors, seven destroyers (two British, five French), and two river gunboats with some smaller craft. The naval gunfire was here particularly useful, since the ships’ guns could reach closer to the Turkish base areas about the Wadi el-Hesi, north of the city. The Turkish railhead at Beit Hanun could be bombarded by the land-based guns, but Deir Sneid, a mile or so to the north, could only be reached by the naval guns. The huge 14–inch guns of the monitor Raglan were targeted on the station at Deir Sneid, then on the ammunition depot, and finally at the road bridge over the wadi to the north, all of which were hit before the spotter seaplane was chased away by one of the German Halberstadts.
This bombardment was the continual background to events in the area for five days (and nights) before any serious attack on the city was mounted. It was in part designed to destroy the enemy positions around the city, but also to hide (by its sheer noise) and distract attention from, the movement of forces from the base area towards the east for the attack on Beersheba.
For over a week the two corps which were to be used in the attack on Beersheba, the Desert Mounted Corps and the XX Corps, were gradually shifted eastwards, slowly, steadily, deceptively, secretly. Their old camps at Rafa and towards the Wadi Ghazze were left standing and lit at night, and the troops themselves moved only at night, and then lay still and hidden by day. Any German aircraft which managed to reach the British lines were forced to fly high to avoid the attentions of the British planes. These precautions, designed to hide the cavalry movements, were only partly successful.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Battle for Palestine 1917 , pp. 109 - 131Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2006