Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- List of Maps
- A Note on Names
- Introduction
- Prologue: To the Border of Palestine
- 1 The Decision to Invade
- 2 Defeat at Gaza
- 3 Defeated Again
- 4 The Wider Context
- 5 The Allenby Effect
- 6 The Third Attempt at Gaza
- 7 The Turkish Lines Broken
- 8 The Drive North
- 9 The Hills of Judaea
- 10 Jerusalem for Chistmas
- 11 Why the British Won
- Appendix: Composition of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force
- Maps
- Notes
- Sources and Bibliography
- Index
7 - The Turkish Lines Broken
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 March 2023
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- List of Maps
- A Note on Names
- Introduction
- Prologue: To the Border of Palestine
- 1 The Decision to Invade
- 2 Defeat at Gaza
- 3 Defeated Again
- 4 The Wider Context
- 5 The Allenby Effect
- 6 The Third Attempt at Gaza
- 7 The Turkish Lines Broken
- 8 The Drive North
- 9 The Hills of Judaea
- 10 Jerusalem for Chistmas
- 11 Why the British Won
- Appendix: Composition of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force
- Maps
- Notes
- Sources and Bibliography
- Index
Summary
THE day after the capture of Beersheba, 1 November, as the East Anglian Division was readying itself for its attempt to break through the lines at Gaza, the Turkish Seventh Army command, at Hebron, counted its men, appealed for help, and began moving its under-strength units into position to meet the next attack. The presence of a British force on the Hebron road at Dhaheriye gave concern. This was Newcombe's Force. Colonel Newcombe was aiming to rouse the Arabs of the Judaean Hills on the pattern of the revolt in Arabia, but they were cautious. The Turks brought a force of German motormen south from Bethlehem, and added two companies of Turkish infantry to them. Newcombe was almost surrounded and, when the Turks attacked on the 2nd, he surrendered. Colonel Husni recorded the events and the ‘bag’:
Lieutenant Avilokh directed his two Turkish [companies] to such good purpose that the enemy could offer no resistance and were immediately surrounded and captured to a man. In this fight we captured an Egyptian [sic] colonel of the General Staff, a captain, three lieutenants, 16 NCOs, 6 men, 30 Arabs, 93 camels, two heavy machine guns, 10 Lewis guns, many rifles, maps, ammunition, cash and important papers. Our losses were 5 killed and 10 wounded, the enemy's 10 killed and 20 wounded.
The overweighting with officers and NCOs was the result of the aim of the expedition; the rank and file would be the Arabs.
The net result of this Turkish success was to block the Hebron road to any further British exploitation; but it also stretched the Turkish forces very thinly, as Colonel Husni reported:
[T]he line was very weak. Two regiments and two batteries (2,000 rifles and eight guns) defended a front of 22 to 23 kilometres, that is less than one rifle per 10 metres. This was in fact the weakest part of the line. The Eighth Army was on its right on a 20 kilometre front with five divisions. Moreover all its reserves were behind the right flank. In fact Tell al Sharia was the key to our front.
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- Information
- The Battle for Palestine 1917 , pp. 132 - 147Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2006