JELLICOE'S departure from the Grand Fleet caused shock amongst his sailors. Promotion to First Sea Lord would, in other circumstances, have been seen as the culmination of a glittering career. In the context of the war, however, many saw it as a demotion. Balfour, too, was removed to the safety of the Foreign Office, and replaced by the Unionist Sir Edward Carson, who was not a huge success. The coalition of December 1916 had not simply brought about changes for the political head of the Admiralty, but throughout the government. The most important of these changes was that Asquith left Downing Street to be replaced by the mercurial David Lloyd George as Prime Minister.

The prevailing view of the Admiralty in the Jellicoe era was that it ‘could have done better’ in the prosecution of the war against Germany. There were many who felt that the naval war was being dictated from Berlin, and that, despite its huge preponderance of ships, the Royal Navy had squandered this advantage, and, displaying an aversion to risk, was happy to let things drift. Jellicoe seemed to give credence to this view when he asserted that, ‘the war will not be won until the enemy's land forces are defeated’. There were those, therefore, who believed that the war could be prosecuted more offensively. Many of these critics tended to believe that Jellicoe's caution was compounded by a lacklustre group of Staff Officers, a second division, where ‘the situation righted itself only slowly’ in 1917.