This book has demonstrated that a number of traditionally held assumptions about the Admiralty War Staff in the First World War are not true. It was not the depository of second-rate, retired or maimed officers, unfit for sea, who passed the war in desk jobs. As has been demonstrated, largely froman analysis of service records, those who worked on the Staff did so not as a result of any perceived inadequacy, but because of their ability. Staff Officers were promoted faster than the average RN officer, and many had a wide range of specialist skills which were of great use during the prosecution of what became the world's most complex conflict. The Executive Officers all had extensive experience of service at sea, and their records demonstrate that they were generally highly regarded by the Navy's most senior pre-war officers, such as Callaghan, Battenberg and Jellicoe.

In terms of their work, they did not pass the war simply issuing ill-judged communications to the fleets, and shuffling pointless paperwork. The Staff did not stifle considered initiatives, such as the use of air power, while devoting much time to pursuing daft schemes such as training seagulls as weapons of war. While it is undeniably the case that mistakes were made, particularly in the early months of the war in 1914, or at Jutland, to use these as the sole criteria of success or failure would be quite incorrect.