Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- Foreword
- Dedication
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 The Admiralty War Staff, 1912–1918: An Analysis of the Personnel
- 2 The Establishment of the War Staff, and its Work before the Outbreak of War in August 1914
- 3 The Churchill–Battenberg Regime, August–October 1914
- 4 The Churchill–Fisher Regime, October 1914–May 1915
- 5 The Balfour–Jackson Regime, May 1915–November 1916
- 6 The Jellicoe Era, November 1916–December 1917
- 7 The Geddes–Wemyss Regime, December 1917–November 1918
- Conclusion
- Appendix A Senior Admiralty and Staff Officials
- Appendix B The Admiralty Telephone Directories, 1914–1918
- Appendix C Administrative Development of the Admiralty War Staff, 1912–1918
- Bibliography
- Index
6 - The Jellicoe Era, November 1916–December 1917
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 September 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- Foreword
- Dedication
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 The Admiralty War Staff, 1912–1918: An Analysis of the Personnel
- 2 The Establishment of the War Staff, and its Work before the Outbreak of War in August 1914
- 3 The Churchill–Battenberg Regime, August–October 1914
- 4 The Churchill–Fisher Regime, October 1914–May 1915
- 5 The Balfour–Jackson Regime, May 1915–November 1916
- 6 The Jellicoe Era, November 1916–December 1917
- 7 The Geddes–Wemyss Regime, December 1917–November 1918
- Conclusion
- Appendix A Senior Admiralty and Staff Officials
- Appendix B The Admiralty Telephone Directories, 1914–1918
- Appendix C Administrative Development of the Admiralty War Staff, 1912–1918
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
JELLICOE'S departure from the Grand Fleet caused shock amongst his sailors. Promotion to First Sea Lord would, in other circumstances, have been seen as the culmination of a glittering career. In the context of the war, however, many saw it as a demotion. Balfour, too, was removed to the safety of the Foreign Office, and replaced by the Unionist Sir Edward Carson, who was not a huge success. The coalition of December 1916 had not simply brought about changes for the political head of the Admiralty, but throughout the government. The most important of these changes was that Asquith left Downing Street to be replaced by the mercurial David Lloyd George as Prime Minister.
The prevailing view of the Admiralty in the Jellicoe era was that it ‘could have done better’ in the prosecution of the war against Germany. There were many who felt that the naval war was being dictated from Berlin, and that, despite its huge preponderance of ships, the Royal Navy had squandered this advantage, and, displaying an aversion to risk, was happy to let things drift. Jellicoe seemed to give credence to this view when he asserted that, ‘the war will not be won until the enemy's land forces are defeated’. There were those, therefore, who believed that the war could be prosecuted more offensively. Many of these critics tended to believe that Jellicoe's caution was compounded by a lacklustre group of Staff Officers, a second division, where ‘the situation righted itself only slowly’ in 1917.
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- The British Naval Staff in the First World War , pp. 170 - 213Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2009