Although consequentialism and Kantianism recommend how to act morally, some allege that they do not necessarily encourage us to become moral beings. Virtue ethicists (hereafter known as ‘virtuists’) regard moral action as intimately woven with the notion of moral character. Unless we imagine that doing is somehow separate from being, the question ‘What should I do?’ links to the broader question ‘Who am I?’. Your inquiry after my health means more to me if you are genuinely concerned than if you are simply trying to produce beneficial effects or are inquiring from a rationalistic sense of duty. If virtuism is often vague in making recommendations for acting (unhelpfully vague, according to its critics), this is because it focuses on the even more complex questions of how best to live. Every action derives from and is a sign of the moral health of our characters, our disposition to embody certain values.

Although contemporary virtuism dates back to the 1950s, it is only since the late 1980s that it has established itself in the canon (Crisp and Slote, 1997; Copp and Sobel, 2004; Williams, 2005; van Hooft, 2006; cf. Nussbaum, 1999b), despite the fact that it springs from one of the oldest traditions of thought.

Aristotle and Hume

The purpose of this section is not to provide an introduction to Aristotle (Rorty, 1980; Broadie, 1991; Kraut, 2006) or Hume (Penelhum, 1992; Norton, 1993) but to outline those components of their ethics that have been most influential on contemporary thinking.

Aristotle (1955, p 63) defines the good as ‘that at which all things aim’. Like consequentialists, he is concerned with the ends of action (teleology) but unlike them he does not believe that those ends can be defined and measured in terms of utility, pleasure or preference. The good already resides within our motivations but is realised (or not) by our actions depending on whether we possess the correct dispositions or qualities of character (the virtues). What do people seek, he asks? What do their actions reveal the best life for man to be?

He observes that humans are characterised by certain ‘functions’ that flourish most completely when expressed through virtuous actions. Just as a tennis player's function is to achieve excellence by playing well, or a carpenter's by making good furniture, so a human's function is to live excellently.