Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-jn8rn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T01:19:03.844Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

1 - Realism and the Absolute Conception

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 December 2009

By
A. W. Moore
Edited by
Alan Thomas
A. W. Moore
Affiliation:
Professor of Philosophy, University of Oxford
Get access

Summary

REALISM, SCIENCE, AND ETHICS

It is often said that Bernard Williams opposes ethical realism. And so he does. But what does this mean? The term “realism” has a notorious and bewildering variety of uses. What does Williams oppose? The first and most basic thing that needs to be emphasized is that what he opposes is just what its name implies: realism about ethics. This highlights something that is becoming increasingly standard in philosophical uses of the term “realism,” namely, its relativization to a subject matter. Granted such relativization, a realist about history may or may not be a realist about mathematics, say. Indeed, we shall see in due course that Williams' opposition to realism about ethics is to be understood precisely in contrast with his acceptance of realism about science.

But here already there is a complication. For the term “realism” is also sometimes used without relativization. We sometimes hear it said of a given philosopher that he or she is a realist tout court. More to the point, we sometimes hear it said of Williams. Moreover, I think this is an appropriate thing to say of him, properly understood. I also think it is an appropriate point of leverage in the attempt to understand his position.

Williams' realism – tout court – receives famous and memorable expression in his book on Descartes, where he writes, “Knowledge is of what is there anyway.”

Type
Chapter
Information
Bernard Williams , pp. 24 - 46
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Blackburn, Simon (1994). “Enchanting Views,” in Clark, Peter and Hale, Bob (eds.), Reading Putnam (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).Google Scholar
Child, William (1994). “On the Dualism of Scheme and Content,” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cockburn, David (1997). Other Times: Philosophical Perspectives on Past, Present and Future (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar
Dancy, Jonathan (1993). Moral Reasons (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald (1984). “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” reprinted in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald (2001). “Indeterminism and Antirealism,” reprinted in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford: Oxford University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fricker, Miranda (2001). “Confidence and Irony,” in Harcourt, Edward (ed.), Morality, Reflection, and Ideology (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
Gibson, Roger F. (1986). “Translation, Physics, and Facts of the Matter,” in Hahn, L. E. and Schilpp, P. A. (eds.), The Philosophy of W. V. Quine (La Salle, IL: Open Court).Google Scholar
Goodman, Nelson (1978). Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.).Google Scholar
Heal, Jane (1989). Fact and Meaning: Quine and Wittgenstein on the Philosophy of Language (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).Google Scholar
Heidegger, Martin (1962). Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).Google Scholar
Hookway, Christopher (1995). “Fallibilism and Objectivity: Science and Ethics,” in Altham, J. E. J. and Harrison, Ross (eds.), World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jardine, Nicholas (1980). “The Possibility of Absolutism,” in Mellor, D. H. (ed.), Science, Belief, and Behaviour: Essays in Honour of R. B. Braithwaite (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar
Jardine, Nicholas (1995). “Science, Ethics, and Objectivity,” in Altham, J. E. J. and Harrison, Ross (eds.), World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996). The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McDowell, John (1981). “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following,” in Holtzmann, S. H. and Leich, C. M. (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).Google Scholar
McDowell, John (1986). “Critical Notice of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy,” in Mind 95.Google Scholar
McDowell, John (1994). Mind and World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).Google Scholar
Moore, A. W. (1991). “Can Reflection Destroy Knowledge?,” in Ratio (New Series), 4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moore, A. W. (1997a). Points of View (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
Moore, A. W. (1997b). “The Underdetermination/Indeterminacy Distinction and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction,” in Erkenntnis 46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moore, A. W. (1999). “Misplaced Celebrations?: Reply to Mark Sacks' Critical Notice,” in International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7.Google Scholar
Moore, A. W. (2001). “Apperception and the Unreality of Tense,” in Hoerl, Christoph and McCormack, Teresa (eds.), Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
Moore, A. W. (2003). “Williams on Ethics, Knowledge, and Reflection,” in Philosophy 78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, Hilary (1992). Renewing Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. (1969). “Reply to Chomsky,” in Davidson, Donald and Hintikka, Jaakko (eds.), Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine (Reidel: Dordrecht).Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. (1981a). “Things and Their Place in Theories,” in Theories and Things (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. (1981b). “Empirical Content,” in Theories and Things (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. (1981c). “On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma,” in Theories and Things (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. (1986). “Reply to Roger F. Gibson,” in Hahn, L. E. and Schilpp, P. A. (eds.), The Philosophy of W. V. Quine (La Salle, IL: Open Court).Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. (1990). Pursuit of Truth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).Google Scholar
Quinn, Warren (1993). “Reflection and the Loss of Moral Knowledge: Williams on Objectivity,” reprinted in Morality and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar
Rorty, Richard (1980). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).Google Scholar
Rorty, Richard (1991a). “Is Natural Science a Natural Kind?,” reprinted in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers Volume I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar
Rorty, Richard (1991b). “Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth,” reprinted in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers Volume I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar
Stevens, Wallace (1954). The Collected Poems (London: Faber and Faber).Google Scholar
Strawson, Galen (1989). The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
Tooley, Michael (1997). Time, Tense, and Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
Williams, Bernard (1972). Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar
Williams, Bernard (1973). “Consistency and Realism,” reprinted in his Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956–1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, Bernard (1978). Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (Harmondsworth: Penguin).Google Scholar
Williams, Bernard (1981). “The Truth in Relativism,” reprinted in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, Bernard (1985). Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana).Google Scholar
Williams, Bernard (1995a). “Ethics and the Fabric of the World,” reprinted in Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers: 1982–1993 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, Bernard (1995b). “Replies,” in Altham, J. E. J. and Harrison, Ross (eds.), World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, Bernard (1996). “Truth in Ethics,” in Hooker, Brad (ed.), Truth in Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1974). Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, rev. ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×