In this chapter and the next, the focus of discussion switches to thought and language. It is in psychological theorizing about the processes responsible for thinking and language use that the internalist picture of the mind has exerted, I think, a particularly powerful influence. This influence has manifested itself in a variety of ways and along a variety of axes. Consequently, in this chapter and the next, the task of unseating the internalist picture takes a variety of forms.

I shall argue, roughly, that the internalist pre-theoretical picture of the mind has influenced theorizing in the following sorts of ways. Firstly, by conceiving of the processes responsible for thought and language use as ones occurring purely inside the head of cognizing, language-using organisms, the picture tempts us into inserting all the constitutive features of thought and language use inside the head. If thought or language use is generative, then the internalist picture tempts us into thinking that the relevant processes occurring inside the head must be generative. If thought or language use is systematic, then the picture tempts us to think that the relevant processes occurring inside the head must be systematic. That is, if thought or language use has a certain structure, a structure judged to be essential to it as such, then the internalist picture tempts us into believing that the relevant processes occurring inside the head, processes which allow us to think or use language, must have that same structure. This is because, according to the internalist picture, it is these processes, and these processes alone, that are essential (in a psychotectonic sense, at any rate) to thought or language use.