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31 - Computational Approaches to Morality

from Part IV - Computational Modeling in Various Cognitive Fields

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 April 2023

By
Paul Bello  and
Bertram F. Malle
Edited by
Ron Sun
Ron Sun
Affiliation:
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, New York
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Summary

Computational work on morality has emerged from two major sources – empirical moral science and philosophical ethics.Moral science has revealed a diversity of moral phenomena: moral behavior (including moral decision making), moral judgments, moral emotions, moral sanctions, moral communication.Philosophical ethics has long focused on moral decision making, and this is where most of the computational work has emerged. Much of it uses rule-based systems rooted in formal logic but is complemented by connectionist, case-based, and other approaches, and more recently by reinforcement learning models.Computational work on moral judgments is sparser, in part because moral judgments build on numerous complex mental capacities, such as causal and counterfactual reasoning and theory of mind. Nonetheless, some models of blame judgments have emerged that draw on information processing approaches from empirical moral science. Even less work has tackled moral emotions, sanctions, and communication – phenomena that present vast challenges and opportunities for future work.

Keywords

moralethicsnormsjudgmentsdecisions
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The Cambridge Handbook of Computational Cognitive Sciences , pp. 1037 - 1063
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2023

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