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101. - Intuition

from I

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2025

By
Kristin Primus
Edited by
Karolina Hübner  and
Justin Steinberg
Karolina Hübner
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Justin Steinberg
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
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Summary

In each of the taxonomies of cognition found throughout Spinoza’s corpus, there is a kind of cognition that is (1) inerrant (TIE[29], KV2.1) or necessarily true (E2p41), (2) a cognition of an essence (TIE[29], E2p40s2) or of the “thing itself” (KV2.2), and (3) a cognition that is intuitive in the sense that it does not require that one work through any demonstrations or practice any “art of reasoning” (KV1.1, TIE[24], E2p40s2).

Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon , pp. 280 - 283
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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References

Recommended Reading

Curley, E. (1973). Experience in Spinoza’s theory of knowledge. In Grene, M. (ed.), Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays (pp. 25–59). Anchor.Google Scholar
Garrett, D. (2010). Spinoza’s theory of scientia intuitiva. In Sorrell, T., Rogers, G. A. J., and Kraye, J. (eds.), Scientia in Early Modern Philosophy (pp. 99–116). Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gueroult, M. (1974). Spinoza, vol. ii: L’Ame (Éthique, 2). Aubier-Montaigne.Google Scholar
Nadler, S. (2006). Spinoza’s Ethics: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Primus, K. (2024). Finding oneself in God: Scientia intuitiva as a metaphysically self-locating thought. In Garber, D. et al. (eds.), Spinoza: Reason, Religion, Politics. The Relation between the Ethics and the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Soyarslan, S. (2016). The distinction between reason and intuitive knowledge in Spinoza’s Ethics. European Journal of Philosophy, 24, 27–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilson, M. (1983). Infinite understanding, scientia intuitiva, and Ethics 1.16. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 8, 181–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yovel, Y. (1989). The third kind of knowledge as alternative salvation. In Spinoza and Other Heretics, vol. i: The Marrano of Reason (pp. 153–71). Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

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