The second Chechen war, launched by Russia's leadership in autumn 1999, was intended to be a breakthrough in the revival of the Russian Army. Vladimir Putin, hand-picked by President Yeltsin as the successor, was generous with promises to make Russia proud again in its military might and to give the Armed Forces every support they needed for achieving the victory. Four years later, heading towards the well-prepared re-election in March 2004, Putin assiduously avoided the topic of the deadlocked war and insisted that there was no need for further military reform, since the Army was perfectly capable of performing its duties. For any unbiased observer, however, no amount of PR spin could hide the fact that the victory had not taken place, and the presidential denial of the Army's continuing degradation was not made any more convincing by the supporting roar from the top brass.

The war in Chechnya can rightly be seen as the ‘original sin’ of Putin's regime, determining such authoritarian features as closeted decision-making, obsession with control over every source of power and rigid censorship of the media. At the same time, this war necessitates the building up of conventional military capabilities, both for suppressing the resistance and for engaging in other conflicts of this type. The maturing ‘patriotic’ ideology of the state-centric regime also places a heavy emphasis on the ability to project power as the ultimate argument in relentless geopolitical contests.