Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Dictatorship, Legality, and Institutional Constraints
- 2 The Constitution of the Exception: Defining the Rules of Military Rule
- 3 The Constitution and the Dictatorship: The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Decree-Laws
- 4 The Shadowy Boundary between Force and Law: The Judiciary, Repression, and the Cosmetic Limitation of Emergency Powers
- 5 Constitutionalization without Transition: Prompting the Dual Constitution of 1980
- 6 The Permanent Text: Constitutional Controls or Military Tutelage?
- 7 Even Custom Shoes Bind: Military Rule under the Constitution, 1981–1988
- 8 Military Dictatorship and Constitutionalism in Chile
- References
- Index
6 - The Permanent Text: Constitutional Controls or Military Tutelage?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Dictatorship, Legality, and Institutional Constraints
- 2 The Constitution of the Exception: Defining the Rules of Military Rule
- 3 The Constitution and the Dictatorship: The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Decree-Laws
- 4 The Shadowy Boundary between Force and Law: The Judiciary, Repression, and the Cosmetic Limitation of Emergency Powers
- 5 Constitutionalization without Transition: Prompting the Dual Constitution of 1980
- 6 The Permanent Text: Constitutional Controls or Military Tutelage?
- 7 Even Custom Shoes Bind: Military Rule under the Constitution, 1981–1988
- 8 Military Dictatorship and Constitutionalism in Chile
- References
- Index
Summary
In August 1980, when the constitution was presented to the public, the charter could not be separated from its authoritarian origins and impact. The constitution had been imposed from above: Narrow, appointed bodies prepared preliminary materials behind closed doors; “the founders,” four nonelected, military commanders, aided by their legal counsel, framed the final text; and the only participation citizens were allowed was to assent in a dubious plebiscite carried out amidst a state of emergency. Similarly, the constitution did nothing to alter the dictatorial character of the regime: Despite some changes (discussed in the following chapter), the transitory dispositions left Pinochet in office as president for an eight-year term, gave him expanded repressive powers, and left the four-man military junta to legislate, as well as exercise other government functions. In its genesis and effects the 1980 constitution appeared as a masterwork of authoritarian constitution making: The main body structured a passable – if controversial – democratic edifice, while behind this façade the real structure of dictatorial power stood, braced by the authoritarian scaffolding of the transitory dispositions.
This immediate effect occluded another dimension of the constitution: Its autocratic origins notwithstanding, the main body of the constitution was never intended to organize an authoritarian regime. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the constitution was crafted neither to assure continuity in power beyond the transitory period nor to grant the armed forces a permanent place from which to dominate civilian politics. The concept of constitutional safeguards set into the 1980 charter was institutional, not tutelary — as Guzmán was wont to insist the constitutional order was to be “self-protected,” secured by organs internal to the political-institutional regime, not by an external guardian, such as the armed forces.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Constitutionalism and DictatorshipPinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution, pp. 217 - 254Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2002