Book contents
- Contemporary State Building
- Contemporary State Building
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Latin America’s Elite Security Taxes
- 3 A Theory of Elite Taxation and the Determinants of Security Taxes
- 4 Colombia’s Targeted Security Taxes
- 5 Costa Rica’s “Soft” Security Taxes
- 6 El Salvador’s Failed and Diffuse Security Taxes
- 7 Mexico’s Uneven Taxation
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- Index
5 - Costa Rica’s “Soft” Security Taxes
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 June 2022
- Contemporary State Building
- Contemporary State Building
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Latin America’s Elite Security Taxes
- 3 A Theory of Elite Taxation and the Determinants of Security Taxes
- 4 Colombia’s Targeted Security Taxes
- 5 Costa Rica’s “Soft” Security Taxes
- 6 El Salvador’s Failed and Diffuse Security Taxes
- 7 Mexico’s Uneven Taxation
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- Index
Summary
Chapter 5 studies the case of Costa Rica, an example of a diminished form of elite taxation due to weak linkages between the government and business elites. Whereas average levels of violence have remained lower in Costa Rica compared to several of its Central American neighbors, economic elites concentrated in the province and canton of San José experienced sharp increases in violent crime. In 2011, the country adopted a flat tax on corporations and earmarked its revenue for public-safety purposes. However, Costa Rica’s left-of-center administrations struggled to overcome obstacles related to elites’ mistrust in government, which led to a much less targeted form of taxation.
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- Contemporary State Building , pp. 87 - 105Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022