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Chapter 4 - Critical Thinking and the Rejection of Unsubstantiated Claims

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 December 2019

By
D. Alan Bensley
Edited by
Robert J. Sternberg  and
Diane F. Halpern
Robert J. Sternberg
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Diane F. Halpern
Affiliation:
Claremont McKenna College, California
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Summary

This chapter examines how critical thinking and a dual-process theory of thinking are related to endorsement of unsubstantiated knowledge claims. Rejecting unsubstantiated claims, such as psychological misconceptions and pseudoscience, is associated with being more inclined and better able to think critically. In dual-process theory terms, people who endorse more unsubstantiated claims tend to rely more on intuitive thinking and less on rational-analytic thinking. Helping people to resist making a rapid, intuitive response to unsubstantiated claims and instead to take a slower, more rational, critical thinking approach can help them reject such claims.

Keywords

conspiracy theorycritical thinkingcritical thinking dispositionscritical thinking skillsdual-process theorymetacognitionparanormal claims psychological misconceptionpseudoscienceunsubstantiated claims
Type
Chapter
Information
Critical Thinking in Psychology , pp. 68 - 102
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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