The southern problem

Though the SLFP suffered more from the JVP during the 1989 general election, that the long term threat from the JVP was to the UNP became clear in the few weeks immediately after 15 February. There was a rapid escalation in violence and a couple of hartals that proved as successful as those at the height of the agitation for elections.

Premadasa however was slow to react. Before the election he released many suspected JVP detainees and revoked the state of emergency that Jayewardene had maintained. Though violence increased dramatically Premadasa did not shift his stand about opening up negotiations with the JVP.

The JVP did not respond. Since they had so soon brought the country to boiling point again, even though elections had been held and therefore the main reason for public discontent mitigated, they thought complete success just round the corner. The first new hartal they called on 22 March proved remarkably successful. This may have been because of resentment on the part of other political parties at what seemed the stealing of the election by the UNP. In addition fear played a great part in the continuing success of JVP demands over the next few months, a psychosis born of the habit of obedience ingrained when JVP tactics seemed the only way to ensure elections.