Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Part I Kingdom and Colony: The Mythology of Race (Pre-history to 1948)
- Part II Dominion to Republic: The Politics of Language (1948–1977)
- Part III The New Monarch: Jayewardene in Control (1977–1983)
- Part IV The New Dominion: India in the Driving Seat (1983–1987)
- Part V Changing the Guard: Premadasa's Emergence (1987–1989)
- Part VI Using the Executive Presidency: Premadasa in Action (1989–1993)
- Chapter 12 Controlling the Country
- Chapter 13 Reform and Reaction
- Chapter 14 Restoring the Balance
- Part VII Using the Spoon: Wijetunge as President (1993–1994)
- Part VIII The Procrastination of a Princess: Kumaratunga in charge (1994–2001)
- Part IX The Baby without the Bathwater: Wickremesinghe as Prime Minister (2001–2004)
- Part X Guarding the Change: Rajapakse's Emergence (2004–2006)
- Select Bibliography
- Index
Chapter 12 - Controlling the Country
from Part VI - Using the Executive Presidency: Premadasa in Action (1989–1993)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 November 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Part I Kingdom and Colony: The Mythology of Race (Pre-history to 1948)
- Part II Dominion to Republic: The Politics of Language (1948–1977)
- Part III The New Monarch: Jayewardene in Control (1977–1983)
- Part IV The New Dominion: India in the Driving Seat (1983–1987)
- Part V Changing the Guard: Premadasa's Emergence (1987–1989)
- Part VI Using the Executive Presidency: Premadasa in Action (1989–1993)
- Chapter 12 Controlling the Country
- Chapter 13 Reform and Reaction
- Chapter 14 Restoring the Balance
- Part VII Using the Spoon: Wijetunge as President (1993–1994)
- Part VIII The Procrastination of a Princess: Kumaratunga in charge (1994–2001)
- Part IX The Baby without the Bathwater: Wickremesinghe as Prime Minister (2001–2004)
- Part X Guarding the Change: Rajapakse's Emergence (2004–2006)
- Select Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The southern problem
Though the SLFP suffered more from the JVP during the 1989 general election, that the long term threat from the JVP was to the UNP became clear in the few weeks immediately after 15 February. There was a rapid escalation in violence and a couple of hartals that proved as successful as those at the height of the agitation for elections.
Premadasa however was slow to react. Before the election he released many suspected JVP detainees and revoked the state of emergency that Jayewardene had maintained. Though violence increased dramatically Premadasa did not shift his stand about opening up negotiations with the JVP.
The JVP did not respond. Since they had so soon brought the country to boiling point again, even though elections had been held and therefore the main reason for public discontent mitigated, they thought complete success just round the corner. The first new hartal they called on 22 March proved remarkably successful. This may have been because of resentment on the part of other political parties at what seemed the stealing of the election by the UNP. In addition fear played a great part in the continuing success of JVP demands over the next few months, a psychosis born of the habit of obedience ingrained when JVP tactics seemed the only way to ensure elections.
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- Declining Sri LankaTerrorism and Ethnic Conlict, the Legacy of J. R. Jayewardene, pp. 159 - 175Publisher: Foundation BooksPrint publication year: 2007