Public opinion data can provide microfoundational evidence for defense's redistributive potential, and determine what role one's relative wealth plays in grand strategic preferences. A classical liberal (or Marxian) analysis might agree that inequality leads to militarization, but explain it as a result of the wealthy's superior political power. However, if the public good of defense actually has redistributive implications then an individual's relatively low wealth should correlate to support for higher defense spending and more aggressive policies, and this does not fit competing explanations.

The first section tests four hypotheses across a broad array of democracies. The most direct test of the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis is to see if one's relative income (wealth, SES, etc.) affects one's attitude towards defense spending:

H1 Respondents with lower income are more disposed to support higher defense spending.

The theory also suggests hypotheses for state-level independent variables:

H2 Higher state-wide inequality will result on average in higher support for defense spending.

H3 Increased public good value for defense will result on average in higher support for defense spending.

H4 Higher military capitalization will result on average in higher support for defense spending.

In addition to the cross-national data, I employ a second data set derived from a survey which asked American respondents to assess foreign policy goals and threats as well as defense spending.