Caste was embedded in India's social order before independence, but its current visibility is significant. Although this book has examined occurrences from each historical period that has opened a generation's eyes to the caste question, caste seems to be far more visible at the time of writing than before. The rise of the Internet and the digital revolution have made caste more visible to both Indian and international audiences. Inequalities and caste-based discrimination are not simply confined to brutal attacks in the Indian countryside, such as those in Karamchedu in 1985 and Tsundur in 1991. But these two critical cases in Andhra Pradesh throw light on why many Dalit activists from this part of India travelled to the World Conference against Racism in South Africa in 2001 to explain that casteism was the same as racism.

What I have described in this book is the way in which caste represents a social phenomenon that is part of everyday social relations, informing politics and articulations of hegemony. During these nearly seventy-two years years since India gained independence, caste has become more visible and politically charged than the constitution-makers might have assumed. In this book, I have explained how Ambedkar's theory of caste indicates that there is an ontological desire to practise caste. This desire remains relevant in contemporary politics. But there are several dimensions to caste, such as stratification, hierarchy and religion, and Ambedkar incorporated them into his concept of graded inequality. This multidimensionality is significant for law. Indeed, I have pointed out how the legal approach to redressing inequalities and providing protection become subject to several changes after independence.

My theoretical objective has been to provide a critical explanation of the relation between caste and law with a focus on Dalits in India's constitutional democracy, where Dalits are socially excluded (as the untouchables) and officially included (as the Scheduled Castes). In fact, following the atrocity cases, it is reasonable to suggest that Dalits are excluded because of an ontological difference – the antagonism between touchables and untouchables – that Ambedkar foregrounds in his theory of caste. Having followed the approach of the late Laclau outlined by Glynos and Howarth, I have argued that a critical explanation requires several dimensions to be delineated and compared; these involve hegemonic ideas and social and political practices.