Several recent international incidents in quick succession have rekindled the sovereignty disputes over the Spratly islets and reefs in the South China Sea and recast a spotlight on the issues. These incidents include the early March visit by Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi to disputed Swallow Reef, the signing by President Gloria Arroyo of the Philippines Baselines Bill, which included the Spratlys in a “regime of islands”, and the unrelated confrontation between a U.S. military survey vessel — the Impeccable — and Chinese vessels. Earlier, in February 2007, then Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian's visit to Taiping Dao drew protests from China, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Nevertheless, the general political environment in the South China Sea seems to have come a long way from the 1980s and 1990s when it was a locus of confrontation and armed conflict. But these latest incidents raise the question of whether these gains are fundamental and durable — or fragile and temporary.

From an optimistic perspective, the China-Vietnam clash of 1988 in which about seventy Vietnamese died, and China's brazen 1995 occupation and building of structures on the Philippines claimed Mischief Reef, seem like relics of a previous era. Conflict has given way to cooperation in which China, Vietnam and the Philippines are undertaking cooperative seismic surveys in an agreed area of their overlapping claims.

In 2002, ASEAN and China signed a Declaration on Conduct in which they promised “to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means without resorting to the threat or use of force” and “to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability”. And China, Vietnam and the Philippines agreed on a web of bilateral codes of conduct. All have also agreed to move towards a more formal and legally-binding multilateral Code of Conduct — although it remains out of reach.

Overall the region — at least at sea — has moved to a lower level of securitization. According to Ralf Emmers of Singapore's Rajaratnam School of International Studies, the reasons include China's “charm offensive”, the lack of discovery of significant petroleum deposits, and self-restraint on nationalist tendencies. Perhaps most important has been the distraction of the United States in the Middle East and the “war on terror”, and thus a damping of China-U.S. competition in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea.