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References

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2017

Edited by
Rik Peels  and
Martijn Blaauw
Rik Peels
Affiliation:
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam
Martijn Blaauw
Affiliation:
Technische Universiteit Delft, The Netherlands
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The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance , pp. 202 - 214
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2016

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  • Edited by Rik Peels, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, Martijn Blaauw, Technische Universiteit Delft, The Netherlands
  • Book: The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance
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  • Edited by Rik Peels, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, Martijn Blaauw, Technische Universiteit Delft, The Netherlands
  • Book: The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance
  • Online publication: 27 January 2017
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9780511820076.012
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