Someone following political debates about crime control or welfare reform might come away with the impression that she was faced with a choice between two incompatible positions. One position, put forward by people usually described as conservatives, claims to make individual responsibility central to political morality. A commitment to a culture of responsibility is said to underwrite advocacy of harsh punishments and reduced social services, not only because such changes will lead to safer streets and more productive lives, but also because people are responsible for their own deeds. Another position in these debates, put forward by people usually described as liberals, advocates building schools instead of prisons, hoping to get at the root causes of crime and to provide adequate opportunities for those who are badly off. The same debates can be seen as revolving around the idea of luck. Liberals are said to be committed to the amelioration of the effects of luck, whereas conservatives resign themselves to the impossibility of doing so. So understood, the debates pit social equality against individual responsibility, and make any compromise between them seem inherently unstable.

One of the central claims of this book is that, far from being opposed ideals, individual responsibility and social equality need to be understood together. A society of equals – a just society, if you like – is also a society that supposes people are responsible for their choices. Though liberals and their conservative critics differ on some fundamental questions of political morality, those differences are not rooted in a liberal rejection of ideas of responsibility.