In this chapter we argue that the attractiveness of the euro for CEE economies has always depended on (1) their willingness and capacity to invest in an independent stabilising monetary policy, and (2) the credibility of the euro project going forward. These are not new criteria, but it is worth recalling that the last decade has dispelled as unfounded the hopes that the euro is a convergence-bringing panacea or a substitute for structural reforms and fiscal discipline. Besides, the crisis and the unfolding fiscal consolidation programmes are reducing the attractiveness of the euro further in the short term. However, it is also worth recalling that the euro has been successful in bringing an important degree of monetary stability to the euro area, and has sheltered its members from many shocks. The attractiveness of the euro project for the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries thus depends on the euro area's ability to build on these achievements. For the CEE countries that have been fixing their currencies, an early euro adoption should be a priority.

The economic debate about euro adoption should be cast in terms of the stabilising role of monetary policy – other considerations may be misleading. At the onset the euro was hoped to improve the long-term macroeconomic performance of member countries, not only in terms of price stability but also in terms of long-term output levels and growth rates. And the arguments portraying the euro as a vehicle of real convergence began to dominate in rationalising the common currency project.