Introduction

As we saw in Chapter 1, Aristotle divided fallacies into those that depended on language and those that did not. Since then among fallacy theorists this has been a popular approach to the organization of fallacies. Until recently, many theorists even repeated the fallacies of language that Aristotle had identified, even where these made little contemporary sense. More recently, we have seen the list expanded to include “new” fallacies of language that reflect modern usage and experience.

On the question of which problems of language are fallacies we also encounter some of the deeper issues of what is to count as a fallacy. Some traditional fallacies of language are not arguments, for example, and some that are do not seem to be invalid. Both these points will be discussed in relation to fallacies taken up in this chapter.

Aristotle's list of fallacies that depend on language numbered six: Equivocation, Amphiboly, Combination of Words, Division of Words, Accent, and Form of Expression. The first two of these can still be found in contemporary lists in the way that Aristotle understood them. We will return to these later. The other four, where they have been retained, have undergone considerable revision of meaning. Aristotle's combination of words and division of words differ considerably from their contemporary instantiations as the fallacies of composition and division. Aristotle was concerned with the ways in which combining and dividing words alter meanings.