Polaris A1 became operational on 15 November 1960, when the submarine George Washington left Charleston, South Carolina, to patrol the Norwegian Sea. Then on 31 January 1961 the second FBM submarine, the Patrick Henry, went on patrol. Each carried sixteen Polaris A1 missiles capable of delivering a nuclear warhead over a range of about a thousand miles to within a few miles of the intended target. Polaris seemed to be an indisputable success.

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SUCCESS

Within four years SPO had developed and deployed a complex new type of weapon system which provided a threat of potential retaliation against Soviet cities, but which itself seemed invulnerable. This success owed much to the skill and dedication of the people who worked on the programme. In particular SPO demonstrated great skill in managing both the ‘technical’ and ‘social’ aspects of technology. Moreover, within certain limits they were able to ‘engineer’ the expectations that Polaris had to meet just as well as the technology that met them.

Schedule was paramount, with a sense of urgency generated not only by concern about the need to counter possible Soviet developments, but also to establish a Navy right to ballistic missiles before the Air Force achieved the hegemony it clearly desired.