Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures and Tables
- Abbreviations and Acronyms
- Foreword
- INTRODUCTION
- Section 1 Contemporary Threats and the Evolving Nature of Warfare
- Section 2 Innovation in Defense and Intelligence
- Section 3 Political and Civilian Impacts on the Future of Warfare
- Section 4 Conflict and Order in the Middle East
- 8 Moving Towards Unity: Making Effective Use of Arab Gulf Forces and Resources
- 9 The Future of Warfare in the 21st Century: The Middle East as a Model
- Contributors
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
9 - The Future of Warfare in the 21st Century: The Middle East as a Model
from Section 4 - Conflict and Order in the Middle East
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 September 2014
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures and Tables
- Abbreviations and Acronyms
- Foreword
- INTRODUCTION
- Section 1 Contemporary Threats and the Evolving Nature of Warfare
- Section 2 Innovation in Defense and Intelligence
- Section 3 Political and Civilian Impacts on the Future of Warfare
- Section 4 Conflict and Order in the Middle East
- 8 Moving Towards Unity: Making Effective Use of Arab Gulf Forces and Resources
- 9 The Future of Warfare in the 21st Century: The Middle East as a Model
- Contributors
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Warfare is very much like a chameleon—its color changes in accordance with the prevailing conditions and surroundings. Warfare is constantly evolving at such a speed that it is difficult to keep pace with its developments; but it is still true that launching a war is much easier than ending one. A leader waging a war thinking that he will be able to manage it, will inevitably after the first salvo become a slave to the conflict, and to all of the eventualities that he did not plan for. Hence, the observation of the famous German military commander Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (1800–1891) that no battle plan ever survived first contact with the enemy. Adaptation in war, therefore, is vital to victory; one must “adapt or die.”
There are many variables in war, and there is no common denominator between them; that is, they cannot be processed simultaneously and in a linear fashion, or by employing an explicit formula—in the words of the Prussian thinker Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), “everything in war is simple, and the simplest thing is difficult.” Indeed, Clausewitz suggested that the most difficult of all was dealing with what he called ‘friction’ — the way in which theoretical forward-planning is incapable of accounting for the multitude of eventualities one may face in real situations.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Future of Warfare in the Twenty First Century , pp. 229 - 256Publisher: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and ResearchPrint publication year: 2014