The final chapter examines the relationship between Glubb’s dismissal, the Suez crisis and the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty in 1957. Glubb’s dismissal is widely considered one of the causes of Britain joining the coalition against the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdul Nasser. Meanwhile, the termination of the treaty is generally regarded as a product of the Suez debacle. This chapter challenges both these contentions. Aided by crucial new documents, it posits an alternative assessment of the British reaction to Glubb’s dismissal, which debunks the notion that Prime Minister Anthony Eden blamed Nasser. If the British blamed anyone, it was Ali Abu Nowar. But instead of seeking retribution, Britain supported his post-Glubb dominance of the Arab Legion. In the short-term, Britain focused on stabilising the Jordanian connection while the long-term value of the alliance was re-evaluated. The upshot of this review was that politically, financially, and militarily, the treaty was deemed a burden. This, combined with rising Arab nationalism, led to the termination of the treaty. Suez merely got in the way of this review and delayed rather than precipitated the treaty’s termination. This chapter thus challenges the notion that Suez marked the end of Britain’s moment in the Middle East.