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11 - Investment governance of defined benefit pension funds

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 July 2011

Roger Urwin
Affiliation:
Towers Watson
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Summary

Introduction

In institutional funds generally and defined benefit pension funds specifically, investment ‘governance’ describes the system of decision-making and oversight that is used to invest the assets of a fund. The responsibility for this investment role lies with trustees or other types of fiduciaries who are faced with high-level investment decisions (where they will typically take full responsibility) and more detailed implementation actions (where delegating to others is more likely to be used and the fiduciaries’ role becomes one of framing the delegations and monitoring the actions of the delegated agents).

Investment governance, therefore, employs skills, resources and processes with the purpose of creating value for institutional funds.

There is a distinction between the inherited structure of investment institutions — normally framed by statute, property rights and covenants — framed by the rules and processes that sustain their performance.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

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References

O’Barr, W.Conley, J.Fortune and FollyHomewood, IllinoisBusiness-One Irwin 1992Google Scholar
Ambachtsheer, K.Pension Revolution: A Solution to the Pensions CrisisNew JerseyWiley Finance 2007Google Scholar
Wyatt, WatsonRemapping Our Investment WorldLondonTowers Watson 2003Google Scholar
Wyatt, WatsonChanging LanesLondonTowers Watson 2004Google Scholar
Wyatt, WatsonSales, Stewardship and Agency IssuesLondonTowers Watson 2007Google Scholar

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