The chapter deals with a crucial transition within Hegel’s Encyclopedia: the transition from its first part – the “science of logic” – to its second part – the “philosophy of nature” (§§244–51). My overall argument will be organized in three, consecutive steps. First I present a rational reconstruction of §244. Secondly I attempt to shed light on Hegel’s characterization of nature as presented in the first paragraphs of the Philosophy of Nature. My aim is to motivate and defend his claim that we can know a priori that nature must be a material space-time system. In the third part I address the question of what it might reasonably mean to claim, as Hegel does, that concepts or universals are “immanent” in nature. I argue that it is crucial, in this context, to take seriously his remark that “the concept” does not as such occur in nature, but only as “internal” (innerlich) or “immersed” (versenkt).