Introduction

The decision to mount an armed intervention is one of the most consequential decisions a president can make. Over the decades following the end of the Cold War, the US has remained a great power and has enjoyed relative stability in coalitional alignments. Yet, since this time, decisions to use force in American foreign policy have varied significantly. Notably, inconsistency has been prevalent not just between administrations, but also within the same one across key cases of humanitarian crises, and responses to the threat of terrorism. Yet, explanations for this variation remain murky, leaving persistent questions regarding how and why decisions to use force, given the enormity of the decision, could vary so significantly. Explaining this remains a key challenge for scholars of foreign policy decision-making and International Relations theorists.

When conflict erupted in the Balkans following the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991, allegations of ethnic cleansing spurred calls for the US to intervene (Chicago Tribune (Pre-1997 Fulltext), 1992; The New Republic, 1992; The New York Times, 1992). President George H.W. Bush declared that the conflict was fuelled by ‘ancient, ethnic rivalries and hatreds’ (Bush, 1992c) concluding that the US did not ‘have a dog in the fight’ (Baker quoted in Power, 2003: 267). Despite early optimism, President Clinton initially adopted a similar position with regards to Bosnia. Yet, following the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995, which saw the systematic slaughter of 8,000 men and boys, Clinton's position shifted as he demanded new policy ideas, stating, ‘This has got to stop. We’ve got to find some kind of policy and move ahead’ (Clinton quoted in Halberstam, 2001: 317). Following sustained aggression from Serbian forces, Clinton, in conjunction with the US's NATO allies, initiated Operation Deliberate Force on 30 August 1995. This bombing campaign would lead to peace talks at Dayton, Ohio, and a negotiated end to the Bosnia war. But why did intervention occur at this time when acts of ethnic cleansing had taken place in Bosnia for several years? What was it about the massacre at Srebrenica that motivated this reinterpretation?

Similarly, when Obama assumed the presidency in January 2009, he was averse to foreign interventions following drawn-out conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.