An important factor in the assessment of our contemporary christological debates is the moral and religious value discernible in incarnational Christology. It is one factor only and cannot stand by itself. Only if the doctrine of the Incarnation is true may we commend it for its moral and religious value. We have no use for Plato's ‘noble lie’. But the questions of truth and value are not entirely separate. While it would be improper to urge the value of the doctrine as the sole ground for thinking it true, it is not unreasonable to suppose that its perceived value may be an indication of its truth. In attempting to give a justification of the Chalcedonian formula, Austin Farrer observed: ‘Look here: the longer I go on trying to tell you about this, the more I become convinced that the job that really wants doing is to expound the formula rather than to justify it; or, anyhow, that the justification required is identical with exposition.’ This may be going a bit far, but certainly part of the justification of the doctrine consists in exposition of its inner rationality, and that includes its moral and religious value. At the very least it may be said that insensitivity to the value of incarnational Christology can lead to a somewhat casual attitude to the historical, experiential and rational grounds for thinking the doctrine to be true.