Part II provides a distinctive analysis of the issue of cartels that remains one of the greatest challenge of competition law enforcement. Cartels are first and foremost the products of individual and organisation-specific factors. This chapter explains that the agency relationship, featuring issues of imperfect information and opportunistic behaviour, approximates adequately the complexity of the internal drivers to collusion. Collusive behaviour is thus defined as a specification of the agency problem that characterises the separation of ownership a control functions in modern firms. Collusive practices may then stem from hidden managerial actions, the legal consequences of which may harm shareholders' interests. The practical implication is that mechanisms of corporate governance, which seek to address the agency problem, are closely related to the collusive narrative. Wrongly designed compensation schemes, or poor internal monitoring may explain participation of firms in cartels. In addition, an analysis of corporate governance systems may shed some light on additional driving forces of cartels. This chapter provides the necessary inquiry into internal drivers that may have been missing from the economic analysis of collusion. As such, this chapter opens the ‘black box’ of the firm disentangling internal dynamics that are fundamental to the study of cartels.