Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-swr86 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-19T13:17:50.487Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - Universality and self-referentiality in quantum mechanics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 November 2009

Peter Mittelstaedt
Affiliation:
Universität zu Köln
Get access

Summary

Self-referential consistency and inconsistency

Universality implies self-referentiality

In the preceding chapters, we have mentioned on several occasions that there are good reasons to consider quantum mechanics as universally valid. Indeed, during the last 70 years quantum mechanics has not been disproved by a single experiment. In spite of numerous attempts to discover the limits of applicability and validity of this theory, there is no indication that the theory should be improved, extended, or reformulated. Moreover, the formal structure of quantum mechanics is based on very few assumptions, and these do not leave much room for alternative formulations. The most radical attempt to justify quantum mechanics, operational quantum logic, begins with the most general preconditions of a scientific language of physical objects, and derives from these preconditions the logico-algebraic structure of quantum mechanical propositions [Mit 78,86], [Sta 80]. There are strong indications that from these structures (orthomodular lattices, Baer*-semigroups, orthomodular posets, etc.) the full quantum mechanics in Hilbert space can be obtained. Although simple application of Piron's representation theorem [Pir 76] does not lead to the desired result, [Kel 80], [Gro 90], there are new and very promising results [Sol 95] which indicate that the intended goal may well be achieved within the next few years. Together with the experimental confirmation and verification of quantum mechanics, these quantum logical results strongly support the hypothesis that quantum mechanics is indeed universally valid.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1997

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×