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8 - The Third Paralogism: unity without identity over time

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Andrew Brook
Affiliation:
Carleton University, Ottawa
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Summary

To my mind, Kant's attack on the Third Paralogism surpasses all other short treatments of the implications for personal identity (identity over time) of the unity of consciousness and the sense of our persistence that goes with it. In brief, Kant shows that neither the unity of consciousness nor our sense of persistence as conveyed in memory and other ways reveals identity, and he lays the foundations of an argument that the unity of consciousness has little or no temporal depth at all. Memory specifically and temporal representation in general require unity of consciousness, and at least one major form of unity requires some forms of memory, namely, synthesis of recognition; but unity, memory, and temporal representation generally are quite compatible with a person being merely the latest in a series of minds or souls or subjects (A363n). Against our intuitions, Kant shows that even a memory of having an earlier experience and doing an earlier act is no proof that it was had or done by the person who now remembers having or doing it. Equally, our sense that we have persisted for quite some time (normally, continuously since about age four or five) is quite compatible with not having persisted for anything like that long. Memory and the sense of having persisted require unity of consciousness, and this unity ‘reaches back’ into the past in a sense.

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Kant and the Mind , pp. 179 - 207
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1994

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