Book contents
- Keynes’s Economic Consequences of the Peace after 100 Years
- Keynes’s Economic Consequences of the Peace after 100 Years
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Plates
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Lessons of Keynes’s Economic Consequences in a Turbulent Century
- 2 The Making of a Classic: Keynes and the Origins of The Economic Consequences of the Peace
- 3 Keynes’s Economic Consequences (1919)
- 4 “Too Bad to Be True”: Swedish Economists on Keynes’s The Economic Consequences of the Peace and German Reparations, 1919–29
- 5 Revisionism as Intellectual-Political Vindication, or the French Receptions of Consequences after the Two World Wars (1919–1946)
- 6 Between Cambridge, Paris, and Amsterdam
- 7 Keynes, the Transfer Problem, and Reparations
- 8 The Speculative Consequences of the Peace
- 9 Why Was Keynes Opposed to Reparations and a Carthaginian Peace?
- 10 One Case Where The Economic Consequences of the Peace Mattered
- 11 Keynes and International Trade Politics after the First World War
- 12 Gold, International Monetary Cooperation, and the Tripartite Agreement of 1936
- 13 Exchange Rates, Tariffs and Prices in 1930s Britain
- 14 “Unusual, Unstable, Complicated, Unreliable and Temporary”: Reinterpreting the Ebb and Flow of Globalization
- 15 Keynes’s Arc of Discovery
- 16 Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, and Popular Perceptions of the First World War
- Index
- Plate Section (PDF Only)
- References
12 - Gold, International Monetary Cooperation, and the Tripartite Agreement of 1936
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 December 2023
By
Book contents
- Keynes’s Economic Consequences of the Peace after 100 Years
- Keynes’s Economic Consequences of the Peace after 100 Years
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Plates
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Lessons of Keynes’s Economic Consequences in a Turbulent Century
- 2 The Making of a Classic: Keynes and the Origins of The Economic Consequences of the Peace
- 3 Keynes’s Economic Consequences (1919)
- 4 “Too Bad to Be True”: Swedish Economists on Keynes’s The Economic Consequences of the Peace and German Reparations, 1919–29
- 5 Revisionism as Intellectual-Political Vindication, or the French Receptions of Consequences after the Two World Wars (1919–1946)
- 6 Between Cambridge, Paris, and Amsterdam
- 7 Keynes, the Transfer Problem, and Reparations
- 8 The Speculative Consequences of the Peace
- 9 Why Was Keynes Opposed to Reparations and a Carthaginian Peace?
- 10 One Case Where The Economic Consequences of the Peace Mattered
- 11 Keynes and International Trade Politics after the First World War
- 12 Gold, International Monetary Cooperation, and the Tripartite Agreement of 1936
- 13 Exchange Rates, Tariffs and Prices in 1930s Britain
- 14 “Unusual, Unstable, Complicated, Unreliable and Temporary”: Reinterpreting the Ebb and Flow of Globalization
- 15 Keynes’s Arc of Discovery
- 16 Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, and Popular Perceptions of the First World War
- Index
- Plate Section (PDF Only)
- References
Summary
The conventional narrative of the 1930s portrays international monetary cooperation as non-existent, disappearing with the collapse of the gold standard during the early years of the decade and reappearing only with World War II and Bretton Woods. I argue, in contrast, that the Western democracies – foremost Britain, France, and the United States – put an end to their monetary war and moved towards peace with the Tripartite Agreement of 1936, through which they agreed to consult on matters of mutual interest and work towards greater stability. To achieve these ends, they created reciprocal gold facilities that brought coherence to the international monetary system and enabled stabilizing exchange intervention. Exploring the operation of these facilities sheds light on the evolution of the international monetary system and the ability of technical cooperation to provide a foundation for broader collaboration.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Keynes's Economic Consequences of the Peace after 100 YearsPolemics and Policy, pp. 300 - 324Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024
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