Book contents
- Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions at 60
- Cambridge Philosophical Anniversaries
- Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions at 60
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Part I Writing Structure
- Part II Normal Science and Science Education
- Part III Incommensurability, Progress, and Revolutions
- 7 Kuhn on Translation
- 8 Paradigm Shifts and Group Belief Change
- 9 The Puzzle of Promise, aka “Kuhn’s Problem”
- 10 The Orwellian Dimension of Scientific Progress
- 11 Essential Tensions in Twenty-First-Century Science
- Part IV Kuhn’s Impact on the Philosophy, Sociology, and History of Science
- Bibliography
- Index
8 - Paradigm Shifts and Group Belief Change
from Part III - Incommensurability, Progress, and Revolutions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 January 2024
- Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions at 60
- Cambridge Philosophical Anniversaries
- Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions at 60
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Part I Writing Structure
- Part II Normal Science and Science Education
- Part III Incommensurability, Progress, and Revolutions
- 7 Kuhn on Translation
- 8 Paradigm Shifts and Group Belief Change
- 9 The Puzzle of Promise, aka “Kuhn’s Problem”
- 10 The Orwellian Dimension of Scientific Progress
- 11 Essential Tensions in Twenty-First-Century Science
- Part IV Kuhn’s Impact on the Philosophy, Sociology, and History of Science
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
What a scientific community holds to be its core beliefs change over time. Gilbert and Weatherall and Gilbert argue that a community’s core beliefs should be understood as a collective belief formed by a joint commitment and that these core group beliefs are difficult to change as it would require a new joint commitment to be formed. This chapter argues that the primary normative constraints on group belief revision are the weight of the evidence being considered by the group, and not the normative constraints that arise from joint commitments. This chapter sketches a positive view of how epistemic groups may respond to new evidence by looking to Kuhn’s own account of how crises arise and are resolved in science.
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- Information
- Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions at 60 , pp. 147 - 164Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024