Law and the Cognitive Science of Ordinary Concepts

doi:10.1017/9781108623056.005

5 - Law and the Cognitive Science of Ordinary Concepts

from I - Metatheory and Methodology

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 April 2021

Edited by

Jaap Hage and

Bartosz Brożek: Affiliation:
Jagiellonian University, Krakow
Jaap Hage: Affiliation:
Universiteit Maastricht, Netherlands
Nicole Vincent: Affiliation:
Macquarie University, Sydney

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Summary

This chapter introduces the ‘folk law thesis’, the claim that ordinary concepts are at the heart of central legal concepts. It presents recent empirical work suggesting that a number of subtle and surprising features of ordinary concepts are also shared by the corresponding legal concept – including features of INTENT, KNOWLEDGE, CONSENT, REASONABLENESS, and CAUSATION. This approach to law opens up a range of new and promising empirical research questions: For each legal concept, what are the features of the corresponding ordinary concept – and what, if any, are the distinctive features of that legal concept? It also opens up an equally vast range of new normative questions: For each feature of the relevant ordinary concept, we can – and should – ask a corresponding normative question: should the legal concept have this or that feature? In this way, the cognitive science of ordinary concepts is not only a useful part of legal psychology, but also a critical part of legal theory and jurisprudence.

Type: Chapter
Information: Law and Mind
A Survey of Law and the Cognitive Sciences
, pp. 86 - 96

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108623056.005 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2021

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5 - Law and the Cognitive Science of Ordinary Concepts

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