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3 - Attempting the impossible

from Part I - Responsibility: some conceptual problems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 September 2009

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Summary

Our relations to the impossible have long been of consuming interest to philosophers. Though everyone is agreed not only that the impossible cannot exist and also that we cannot do the impossible, there has been much speculation and divergence of opinion about which other relations one can have to the impossible. Thus, it has been maintained by some and denied by others that one can conceive of the impossible, that one can imagine the impossible, that one can believe the impossible, and that one can intend the impossible. It is also much disputed – and this is our present problem – not only by philosophers, but by both courts of law and by the text book writers on the law, whether one can attempt the impossible.

Though the Criminal Codes, where any exist, of many, or perhaps most, countries allow the possibility of attempting the impossible, on almost every kind of example of attempting the impossible and in almost every jurisdiction, cases can be quoted of opposing judicial decisions. Thus, attempting to steal from an empty pocket or room was allowed as a possibility in England in Brown in 1889 and in Ring in 1892, in Scotland in Lamour v. Strathern in 1933, in France in a 1876 case, in the United States in State v. Meisch in 1965 and Gargan v. State in 1968, and in Canada in Reg v. Scott in 1964; but denied in England in McPherson in 1857, in Collins in 1864, in Partington v. Williams in 1975, and in Prussia in an 1854 case.

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Liability and Responsibility
Essays in Law and Morals
, pp. 65 - 86
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1991

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