We are now ready to take a closer look at the bracketing strategy. The bracketing strategy starts with a simple idea: to justify a conclusion to a person we need to start with premises he or she can accept. It then extends this simple idea to political justification: to justify a political conclusion to all citizens we need to start from premises all of them can accept. If the citizens in a political community hold a multitude of incompatible moral, philosophical and religious views, we are led naturally to the demand that political justification proceed from a set of shared beliefs, ideals and values. To meet this demand citizens must bracket their differences and search for common ground.

In one form or another, a number of contemporary political philosophers defend the bracketing strategy. But it has received its most rigorous expression in the recent work of John Rawls. By focusing on his work, we can best bring out the problems with the strategy in general. Yet while the focus will be on Rawls, I intend to reach a general conclusion about the bracketing strategy. Accordingly, in discussing him, I will (particularly in chapter four) draw freely on the work of others who are sympathetic to his views. This will allow me to supplement his arguments where they are undeveloped or not fully spelled out and to anticipate possible responses he could make to my criticisms. In this way, I hope to give the bracketing strategy a fair run for its money.