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4 - Dilemmas in state regulation of private security exports

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 September 2009

Deborah D. Avant
Affiliation:
George Washington University, Washington DC
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Summary

In the modern era, state control over force has not only meant control of the force they field, but also control over the force that emanates from their territories. States have acted to control the violent activities of their citizens outside their borders, restricting their actions on behalf of other states and regulating trade in the instruments of violence. This chapter investigates the impact of the market for security services on states' control of the force that emanates from their territories. Optimists suggest that using well-established norms will allow states to control the export of security services and argue that these exports provide a flexible new tool by which to generate state security. Pessimists, however, worry that the export of these services will frustrate states' consequential controls and that export industries may influence the articulation of state interests in ways that undermine “national” security.

The literature on the arms trade provides some useful context. Analysts of arms exports have recognized that industries that produce tools of war present states with dilemmas. Some of the same dilemmas are articulated in the debate between optimists and pessimists about the export of security services. On the one hand, PSCs draw on the skills learned in their state's military and share skills along with information about effective military organization with their employer state in ways that their home state might want to control.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Market for Force
The Consequences of Privatizing Security
, pp. 143 - 177
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2005

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