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4 - From World War II to the Accord

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 May 2010

Robert L. Hetzel
Affiliation:
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
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Summary

The juxtaposition of the Great Depression and World War II raised expectations dramatically of what government stabilization policies could achieve. In 1932, the unemployment rate rose to 23.6%. In 1939, it was still 17.2%. In 1945, the last year of the war, the unemployment rate was 1.9%. The juxtaposition of massive unemployment in the Depression and full employment during World War II provided apparently incontrovertible evidence that government spending could provide a countercyclical stimulus to the economy. The Employment Act of 1946 gave the government responsibility for full employment. However, there appeared to be no place for monetary policy in the arsenal of government policies.

A changed Intellectual Environment

According to real bills, government could do nothing to arrest the painful economic adjustments that inevitably followed the collapse of a speculative mania. Depression had to run its course to eliminate excessive debt and to correct a maladjusted structure of wages and prices. The memoirs of Herbert Hoover (1952, 30) have forever associated this view with his Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon, whom Hoover labeled a “leave it alone liquidationist”:

Mr. Mellon had only one formula: “Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate.” He insisted that, when the people get an inflation brainstorm, the only way to get it out of their blood is to let it collapse. He held that even a panic was not altogether a bad thing. He said: “It will purge the rottenness out of the system. High costs of living and high living will come down.[…]

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2008

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