Abstract

This essay focuses on an important similarity of the character of state-citizen interaction found across South and Southeast Asia: the dependency of citizens on personal connections to deal with state institutions. While the capacity of Asian states to penetrate society is growing, personal exchanges of favors through informal social networks often undermine the capacity of state institutions to implement policies and laws in an impersonal, rule-bound manner. As a result, South and Southeast Asian countries are sometimes described as “patronage democracies” because of the dependence of citizens on clientelistic exchanges with politicians to gain access to state benefits. This informality is often attributed to particular “Asian” cultural traits: in this view the pervasiveness of clientelism, identity politics, and the particularized implementation of state regulations are due to the importance that Asian citizens attach to personal obligations and norms of reciprocity. In this essay I develop an alternative explanation. I argue that the importance of personal exchange relations grew out of the particular colonial process of state formation that most Asian countries went through. As the state has generally been experienced as an alien and oppressive force, personal exchange relationships have been a stronger guarantee of personal security and welfare. As a result politics and governance in South and Southeast Asia are shaped by a massive collective action problem: while both citizens and power holders might prefer a rule-bound state and a strong rule of law, they would jeopardize their welfare, security and career if they ignored the obligations embedded in personal relationships.

Keywords: Informality; governance; clientelism; rule of law