In September 1991, at the time of Warren Quinn's sadly early death, he had completed all the papers reprinted in this volume; most had been published and even the last two were at the printers. Earlier, the Cambridge University Press had approached him about a collection of articles, and after his death I suggested that I should edit them. The selection had to be mine, but I think that Quinn himself would have agreed, first in including everything (except book reviews) published from the eighties onward and second in leaving out some earlier papers; these earlier articles show the same excellence of mind, but are not, I judge, of the same enduring interest.

With the exception of essay number 10 (an intriguing contribution to decision theory) the present papers are all on central topics of moral philosophy, and are, in spite of their rigor, such as to be comprehensible to philosophy students and even to nonphilosophers. They fall into four main categories: 1. Essays 1,5, and 6 are critical pieces expressing Quinn's dissatisfaction with arguments advanced by other philosophers on the topic of the objectivity of moral judgment. 2. Essays 2 and 3 deal, in depth, with substantive moral issues: the first with abortion, the second with punishment. 3. Essays 8 and 9, originally written as a single paper, belong in the very important middle area between philosophical psychology and casuistry, where such concepts as doing, allowing, and intending are explored.