Including Prussia among the five great powers is misleading. Based on its paltry resources, small population, and indefensible frontiers, the kingdom legitimately stood as the most powerful of the second-tier states such as Spain, Portugal, Naples, Bavaria, and the Ottoman Empire. The Prussians themselves recognized this fact. After Frederick the Great's War of Bavarian Succession (1778–1779) against Austria, Prussia did not want to risk a unilateral conflict against another great power. Prussia's deference to Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and France became quite apparent just two years after Frederick's death. In 1788, his nephew and successor, Frederick William II, assumed the status of junior partner in the Anglo-Prussian effort to end the Patriot Revolt in the Netherlands. In 1792, the alliance with Austria during the War of the First Coalition again relegated Prussia to junior status, as did Russia's orchestration of the Second and Third Partitions of Poland in 1793 and 1795 respectively. The situation did not change under Frederick William III. During the 1803 reorganization of Germany, the Prussians were quite content to have Napoleon to take the lead. In 1805, Alexander goaded Frederick William toward war with Napoleon but within the security of a multipower coalition. Prussian participation in the War of the Third Coalition did not come to pass, yet the War of the Fourth Coalition in the following year clearly demonstrated to the Prussians that they could not stand alone against another great power. Alexander did come to Frederick William's aid, but not in time. This became the crucial question of Prussia's pro-Russian party in 1811: could and would the tsar arrive in time to save Prussia from total annihilation? How much trust could the Prussians place in the timely support of Great Britain – which had committed its small army to Iberia – and Austria, now bound to Napoleon through marriage? Scharnhorst believed that only a miracle could save Prussia.