In the dark night of 1/2 May, Blücher's corps became strung out on the ten-mile march from Rötha to Pegau. As a result, the head of his column rather than the whole corps reached Audigast late, around 5:00 A.M. With the disposition awaiting him two miles further west at Pegau, Blücher did not know that Yorck's corps would be moving southwest from Zwenkau to strike the Rötha–Pegau road in accordance with Wittgenstein's instructions to be “immediately behind Blücher's columns around 5:00 A.M.” Although some discrepancy exists among the sources, it appears that Blücher directed his foremost brigades – Zieten's 2nd and Klüx's 1st – to Storkwitz as the right wing. While marching to Storkwitz, Zieten's brigade collided with the lead unit of Yorck's corps at Audigast (see Map 3). The resulting entanglement and confusion cost the Prussians four precious hours. It did little good that Wittgenstein, who rode up and met with Yorck's staff for a short while, explained how the Corsican, with his back to Berlin, would be forced to accept battle on terms that favored the Allies. The bungled march particularly aggravated General Friedrich Heinrich von Hünerbein, commander of Yorck's 8th Brigade, who sarcastically shouted to Chaplain Schultze that Wittgenstein seemed all too willing to give a consolation sermon. After clearing his troops from the road, Yorck waited for Blücher's brigades to march past. As soon as Dolffs's Reserve Cavalry struck the road to Pegau, Yorck followed. This meant that Blücher's left wing column, Röder's Reserve Brigade, which remained far behind due to the slow march from Rötha, first needed to wait for Yorck and then Berg to pass.