Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Note on texts and citations
- Chapter 1 Interpreting Nietzsche on truth
- Chapter 2 Nietzsche and theories of truth
- Chapter 3 Language and truth: Nietzsche's early denial of truth
- Chapter 4 The development of Nietzsche's later position on truth
- Chapter 5 Perspectivism
- Chapter 6 The ascetic ideal
- Chapter 7 The will to power
- Chapter 8 Eternal recurrence
- Bibliography
- Index
Chapter 2 - Nietzsche and theories of truth
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Note on texts and citations
- Chapter 1 Interpreting Nietzsche on truth
- Chapter 2 Nietzsche and theories of truth
- Chapter 3 Language and truth: Nietzsche's early denial of truth
- Chapter 4 The development of Nietzsche's later position on truth
- Chapter 5 Perspectivism
- Chapter 6 The ascetic ideal
- Chapter 7 The will to power
- Chapter 8 Eternal recurrence
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
As my first chapter suggests, much of the disagreement regarding Nietzsche's position on truth stems from differences in the philosophical views of his interpreters. Heidegger provides only the most obvious example. Philosophical views affect not only the texts interpreters draw from, but also the way in which they interpret them. Finding the nihilism with which they sympathize in Nietzsche's early works and the Nachlass, nontraditionalists interpret his later books in terms of it. Those with more traditional sympathies, on the other hand, can find in Nietzsche's later work a commitment to both the existence and value of truth, and therefore minimize the importance of the Nachlass.
There is nothing regrettable about this situation. Reasonable interpretation clearly demands that we attribute to a text the best position compatible with the relevant evidence about its meaning. But only what the interpreter takes to be true or reasonable can function as the standard for the best position. Appeal to the interpreter's own standards will be necessary not only when there are two equally plausible interpretations of a given text, but also for the purpose of selecting which texts to interpret or consider as evidence. No interpretation can take explicitly into account every preserved sentence Nietzsche wrote.
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- Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy , pp. 29 - 62Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1991
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