Nietzsche says much about truth that is interesting and quite influential. As I argue in Chapter 1, it is also problematic and perhaps even self-contradictory. In this study I attempt to make sense of it, and I emphasize aspects of the problem of truth that bear on Nietzsche's view of the role of philosophy. Throughout I try to make the best case for what I take him to be saying. More accurately, as far as Nietzsche's texts allow, I avoid attributing to him positions against which there are obvious objections. As will be clear from Chapter 3, this approach does not ensure the defensibility of his claims. I argue that Nietzsche's early position on truth is vulnerable to fatal objections, although it is the position that has recently won him disciples and considerable influence. I also argue that Nietzsche himself eventually rejected this now influential position and suggest that some of his greatest thinking was called forth by his attempt to understand what was wrong with it and the source of its hold on him.

I will be happy if my work contributes to efforts to show that Nietzsche was a great thinker. Of course, he was much more than that; he was a great writer.