This chapter canvasses the main features of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, both early and late. It also assesses these features for their merits, partly with a view to current debates. I shall argue that his radical position is more than a whimsical manifestation of an anti-scientific ideology: it is supported by arguments deriving from astute observations about the peculiar character of philosophical problems on the one hand, and logico-semantic ideas on the other. In particular, I shall defend Wittgenstein's claim that the distinctive task of theoretical philosophy is a priori and hence conceptual. The chapter also diagnoses three tensions in Wittgenstein's account of conceptual elucidation: (i) treating it as a kind of (psycho-) therapy or propaganda for a particular point of view vs. regarding it as a type of dialectic argument; (ii) insisting on it having a purely critical purpose in dissolving philosophical puzzles vs. allowing for a more positive project of conceptual self-understanding; (iii) rejecting systematic theories vs. envisaging systematic surveys of our conceptual scheme. It urges, moreover, that these tensions should be resolved in favour of the second members of these pairs of alternatives. Finally, in line with my contention that Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical views are both supported by and in turn support certain of his philosophical views, the chapter casts aspersions on an ambition that Wittgenstein and many of his followers share with other metaphilosophers (notably Descartes, phenomenologists and logical positivists). According to the ‘myth of mere method’, one can metaphilosophically reform philosophy by devising procedures for the resolution of philosophical problems that do not in turn depend on contestable philosophical views derived by way of equally contestable methods. Abandoning the myth leads to a more sober and modest conception of philosophy's ‘metaphilosophical’ reflection on its own nature.

Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy and the Cognitivist Mainstream

Wittgenstein's interest goes back to 1912, when he gave a paper ‘What is Philosophy?’ to the Moral Sciences Club at Cambridge. In the preface of the Tractatus he boasted of having provided a ‘definitive solution’ to ‘the problems of philosophy’. In 1930 he maintained that his ‘new method’ of philosophizing constituted a ‘kink’ in the ‘development of human thought’ comparable to the Galilean revolution in science.