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References

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2009

Joost Pauwelyn
Affiliation:
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva
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Optimal Protection of International Law
Navigating between European Absolutism and American Voluntarism
, pp. 207 - 219
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2008

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  • References
  • Joost Pauwelyn, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva
  • Book: Optimal Protection of International Law
  • Online publication: 07 July 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511494291.010
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  • References
  • Joost Pauwelyn, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva
  • Book: Optimal Protection of International Law
  • Online publication: 07 July 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511494291.010
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  • References
  • Joost Pauwelyn, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva
  • Book: Optimal Protection of International Law
  • Online publication: 07 July 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511494291.010
Available formats
×