The typical concerns of the Philosopher of Mind might be represented by three questions: (1) How do we know that other people have pains? (2) Are pains brain states? (3) What is the analysis of the concept pain? I do not wish to discuss questions (1) and (3) in this chapter. I shall say something about question (2).†

Identity questions

‘Is pain a brain state?’ (Or, ‘Is the property of having a pain at time t a brain state?’)‡ It is impossible to discuss this question sensibly without saying something about the peculiar rules which have grown up in the course of the development of ‘analytical philosophy’ – rules which, far from leading to an end to all conceptual confusions, themselves represent considerable conceptual confusion. These rules – which are, of course, implicit rather than explicit in the practice of most analytical philosophers – are (1) that a statement of the form ‘being A is being B’ (e.g. ‘being in pain is being in a certain brain state’) can be correct only if it follows, in some sense, from the meaning of the terms A and B; and (2) that a statement of the form ‘being A is being B’ can be philosophically informative only if it is in some sense reductive (e.g. ‘being in pain is having a certain unpleasant sensation’ is not philosophically informative; ‘being in pain is having a certain behaviour disposition’ is, if true, philosophically informative).